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NOTES
BAD FAITH PROSECUTIONS OF CIVIL RIGHTS
MATTERS IN STATE COURTS-FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
OF SUBJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN FEDERAL COURTS
INTRODUcTION

Since the somewhat placid attitudes of the 1950's1 this country has witnessed some rather significant changes. The unifying principles of the
1960's seem to be involvement and activism, focusing chiefly upon the
civil rights movement. And though the civil rights movement encompasses
a rather broad spectrum of affairs, most would concede that the central
concern of this movement has been the plight of the Negro in our society.
Even at this stage in our thinking about racial matters, the tactics of civil
disobedience provide a significant, albeit unfortunate method of calling
attention to the problems of the Negro. It is important that we reconsider
and re-think the place of civil disobedience in this country, for there are
indications that it will continue as a force within our system.
But as the Negro's situation continues to improve, it is evident that other
methods will be used to accomplish desired ends. Essential to the success
of less forceful devices, however, is an atmosphere which allows freedom of
expression and some hope of fair treatment. As Dean Griswold has so
acutely recognized:
The Negro, and his supporters, march in the streets not because the
law is not clear, but because it has not been followed. He knows from
long experience that a resort to the courts will far too often result,
initially, in delay, frustration, injustice, and denial of clearly defined
rights. It is small comfort to him that three years later he will get
justice from the Supreme Court of the United States. Justice-true and
real justice-should be dispensed by voting registrars, sheriffs, the
police, school boards, district attorneys, justices of the peace, and the
others close at hand who represent the authority of the State, and who
use their authority far too often to perpetuate a system of social control, which may represent what has been regarded as the southern way
of life, but which is wholly inconsistent with rights established by
valid Federal power as a part of "the supreme Law of the Land."2
1

See SATIN, THE 1950's: AMERICA's "PLAcID" DECADE (1960).

2 U.S. COAIM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTs, ENFORCEMENT; A REPORT ON EQUAL PROTECTION IN TIIE

SOUTH 186-87 (1965) (separate statement of Commissioner Erwin N. Griswold) (Report
hereinafter cited as U.S. CoMm'N REPORT ON EQUAL PROTECTION).
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His contention that some state courts, especially in the South, have not
adequately protected these rights seems beyond dispute.3 While many solutions have been proposed, currently much emphasis is placed upon the
possibilities of injunctive relief granted by the federal courts against statecourt proceedings. The Supreme Court in Dombrowski v. Pftster" broadened the criteria for injunctive relief in civil rights cases. Yet that case,
though providing relief for many litigants, leaves much uncertainty in this
area of the law. It is the purpose of this paper to sketch the historical background of this aspect of injunctive relief, to attempt a delineation of the
present scope of the Dombrowski remedy, and to examine the impact of
subsequent cases upon that remedy. Moreover, emphasis will be placed
upon the impact of these legal problems upon our federal system and upon
the work of the federal courts. The focus of this Note is upon injunctive
relief in the federal court against state proceedings or anticipated proceedings, although other forms of relief in the federal court, such as removal
and habeas corpus, will be brought into this discussion.5
BACKGROUND

Before dealing with the focal points of this Note, it is necessary to consider the historical environment in which recent cases have been decided.
No attempt will be made to discuss in detail this background, as most of
these problems are adequately considered elsewhere; rather, this background sketch is intended to serve as a means of acquainting the reader
with the exact nature of the problems presented later in this Note.
As early as 1793 statutory recognition was given to the notion that the
federal courts should not enjoin state proceedings.0 But this general proposition soon became subject to numerous exceptions. This erosion continued
until 1941 with the much discussed case of Toucey v. New York Life Ins.
Co.7 Thereafter, Congress attempted to alleviate the confusion in this area
with the following language:
3 US. COMM'N REPor ON EQUAL PRoTEMc N, supra note 2, gives a detailed report on
these abuses. See also KUNSTLeR, D=E IN zeY HEART (1966).
4 280 U.S. 479 (1965) (hereinafter referred to as Dombrowski).
5 See generally Annot., Anticipatory Relief in Federal Courts Against State Criminal
Prosecutions Growing Out of Civil Rights Activities, 8 A.L.Rd 301 (1956). For a discussion of habeas corpus, see Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaran-

teed Civil Rights: FederalRemoval and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court
Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 793 (1965); Wright & Sofaer, Federal Habeas Corpus For State
Prisoners:The Allocation of Fact-FindingResponsibility, 75 YA=x
.J. 895 (1966).
6 Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 335, which provided that no writ of injunction might be granted on the part of federal courts to stay proceedings in any state court.
See the discussion in Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 814 U.S. 118, 129-41 (1941). See

generally Durfee & Sloss, Federal Injunction Against Proceedings in State Courts: The
Life History of a Statute, 30 Mici. L. Ray. 1145 (1932).
7 814 U.S. 118 (1941).
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A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay
proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of
Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or
effectuate its judgments.8
The anti-injunction statute has been held inapplicable to situations in
which the state prosecution has not yet begun.9 Yet, even here, the courts
8 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964). See Comment, Federal Injunctions Against Proceedings in
State Courts, 35 CALIF. L. RaV. 545 (1947); Comment, Anti-Suit Injunctions Between State
and Federal Courts, 32 U. Cm. L. REv. 471 (1965). For cases interpreting this statute see
Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964); Leiter Minerals v. United States, 352 U.S.
220 (1956); Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511
(1955). The American Law Institute in STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JU~isDcrloN BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERA COURTS (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1966), has proposed the following restate-

ment of § 2283:
A court of the United States shall not grant an injunction to stay proceedings In
a State court, or the enforcement of a judgement of a State court, unless such an Injunction is otherwise warranted, and: (1) an Act of Congress authorizes such relief
or provides that other proceedings shall cease; or (2) the injunction is requested by
the United States, or an officer or agency thereof; or (3) the injunction is necessary
to protect the jurisdiction of the court over property in its custody or subject to its
control; or (4) the injunction is in aid of a claim for interpleader; or (5) the injunction is necessary to protect or effectuate a prior judgment of the court; or (6) the
injunction is sought to preserve temporarily the status quo pending determination
of whether this section permits grant of a permanent injunction.
Id. at 19. The commentary on this section provides an excellent background discussion
of this problem and also a discussion of the scope of and justification for the proposed
changes. Id. at 114-25.
For the purposes of this civil rights discussion, one of the most controversial questions
presently is whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) can be interpreted as express authorizations
for a stay of state proceedings. This section provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper pro.
ceeding for redress.
The Supreme Court in Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741 (1965), refused to rule on this
question. Courts in Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 939 (1965); Goss v. Illinois, 312 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1963); and Sexton v. Barry, 233
F.2d 220 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 870 (1956), have held in the negative. But In
Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1950), it was held that the former equivalent
of § 1983 was an express exception to § 2283. A case from the fifth circuit, Dilworth v.
Riner, 343 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1965), has held that portions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
provided an express exception to § 2283. For an excellent discussion of this problem see
Note, The Dombrowski Remedy-Federal Injunctions Against State Court Proceedings
Violative of Constitutional Rights, 21 RtrrGras L. Rv. 92 (1966). This work provides an
extensive analysis of the history of § 1983 and § 2283 and the cases construing these
statutes, and concludes that § 1983 is definitely an express exception.
9 See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Carmichael v. Allen, Civil No. 10421,
N.D. Ga., Dec. 13, 1966.
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have developed an abstention doctrine by reason of comity which can pro-

vide an equally rigid bar to federal stays of state proceedings. For a number
of years the classic case cited for this proposition was Douglas v. City of
Jeannette.1o This case involved a suit in federal court by Jehovah's Witnesses to enjoin the further enforcement of a licensing ordinance. The

petitioners asked for equitable relief, alleging that the continued enforcement of the statute deprived them of first-amendment protections. The
Court held an injunction should not have issued. Nonetheless, the Court
did concede that the district court had the power to decide the case, but
ruled that the federal court should interfere with the state criminal processes only on a showing of danger of irreparable injury "both great and

immediate."
A rather extensive discussion of the law in this area is found in Beal v.
Missouri Pac. R.R.," where the Court said:
It is a familiar rule that courts of equity do not ordinarily restrain

criminal prosecutions....
This is especially the case where the only threatened action is the
prosecuton in the state courts by state officers of an alleged violation
of state law, with the resulting final and authoritative determination
of the disputed question whether the act complained of is lawful or
unlawful....
Hence interference with the processes of the criminal law in state
courts, in whose control they are lodged by the Constitution, and the
determination of questions of criminal liability under state law by
federal courts of equity, can be justified only in most exceptional circumstances, and upon clear showing that an injunction is necessary
in order to prevent irreparable injury.' 2
Though much uncertainty still surrounds these earlier decisions, several
observations can be made about them which aid interpretation of later
cases. When comparing these earlier decisions with more recent cases, one
5
is immediately struck by the different contexts in which they arose.'
Although generalization is perhaps dangerous, it seems evident that the
Negro unrest of recent years has been the dominant context in which
recent cases have arisen; likewise, the element of first-amendment privileges
has been the central concern in this area. A second observation is the early
development of the principle that only threatened prosecutions may be
enjoined. 14 This distinction, which still remains in force, has been justified
on a number of grounds. Possibly the most evident reason is the simple fact
10 319 US. 157 (1943).
11 312 U.S. 45 (1941).
12 Id. at 49-50.
13 See the extensive discussion of earlier cases in Note, Federal Injunctions Against State
CriminalProceedings,4 STAN. L. Rxv. 381 (1952).

14 See id. at 386-90.
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that stopping an intended prosecution offers a substantially smaller opportunity for affront to the state and interferes less with the state criminal
processes than would the stay of a prosecution already in process. Nonetheless, it does seem as if some reevaluation is needed, as the present law is
unsatisfactory. The current law forces the defense attorney to race to get
into the federal court before the state prosecution begins. Also, it is sometimes difficult to know whether the prosecution will actually begin. If an
attorney fails to reach the federal court in time, he then must defend in the
state courts and await an opportunity to argue before the Supreme Court.
This is grossly unfair in the case of a patently badfaith prosecution,
Finally, it must be noted that these earlier decisions did recognize the
possibility that a federal court could exercise its equity powers in certain
cases. One source' 5 has outlined three main criteria for determining whether
the exercise of equitable jurisdiction was proper. First

. .

. the petitioner

must attack the statute he seeks to enjoin as repugnant to a federal statute
or the Constitution. .

.

. Secondly, there must be a clear showing that

imminent enforcement of the statute is threatened. ... The third consideration is the excessive cost involved in complying with or challenging the
state statute in a local court. Injunctive relief is usually granted if a large
fine or fee must be paid, or multiple prosecutions for successive offenses are
threatened. 16 This third consideration underscores the emphasis of these
older decisions upon, for the most part, economic injury, injury to property,
as "irreparable injury."
DOMBROWSKI

Yet change was inevitable, for profound forces were at work in our
system. Reference was made in the introduction of this paper to some of
these forces and to the sad situation that existed in the administration of
justice. The judicial consciousness began to focus upon the need to protect
the ultimate weapon of oppressed persons-the right of free expression.
Moreover, the void-for-vagueness doctrine, long before established, began
to appear more frequently.17 Likewise, attention was focused upon the more
subtle devices that were perpetuating these conditions. Advocates, intimately engaged in the struggle for change, began to present their arguments before the intellectual community.18 Gradually, decisions began to
appear which granted injunctive relief. In Browder v. Gayle,O the enforce.
15 Comment, Federal Injunctions and State Enforcement of Invalid Criminal Statutes,
65 COLUM. L. Rlv. 647 (1965).
16 Id. at 650, 651.
17 See, e.g., Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1966); Edwards v. South Carolina, 872
U.S. 229 (1963). See generally Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
1 See, e.g., KuNsmTER, DEEP IN My HEART (1966); SotrrHnER Jus-TcE (Friedman ed.
1965); Amsterdam, supra note 5.
19 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. N.D.), aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
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ment of Alabama segregation statutes was enjoined. Thereafter, the scope
of this decision was broadened in Morrison v. Davis20 and Busch v. Orleans
Parish School Bd.21 Possibly these and other decisions could have been
dismissed, however, as merely meeting the "irreparable injury" and "extraordinary circumstances" tests of the older cases. Finally, in 1965, the
Supreme Court addressed itself, in the context of civil rights, to the increasing problem of federal injunctions against state prosecutions: Dombrowski
v. Pfister22 was decided. Though the facts of Dombrowski are quite complex,23 basically the case involved an attempt in the federal courts to enjoin
the enforcement of the Louisiana "anti-subversion laws." The originallyattempted prosecution had been vacated for lack of facts necessary to continue prosecution. But demands continued for the prosecution of these
persons, and their attorneys consequently petitioned for relief in the district
court. They requested a declaratory judgment and temporary and permanent injunctions against further prosecutions, on the ground that the
laws were unconstitutional on their face and unconstitutional as applied.
24
Also, they sought injunctive relief under various civil rights statutes,
alleging that the prosecutions were not made in a good faith effort to obtain
valid convictions, but rather to discourage civil-rights activity.2 5
The three-judge district court refused to issue an injunction and held
that it would not determine the constitutionality of the Louisiana law in
advance of appropriate proceedings in the state court. The majority opinion
viewed this case as involving "the paramount right of a state to self-preservation.".2 The essential emphasis of the majority opinion was upon this
factor, although later in the opinion the majority discussion focuses upon
states rights, upon the danger of the federal courts impinging upon the
sovereignty of a state. Judge Wisdom in his dissenting opinion places emphasis upon this latter basis in saying, "To me, the majority's decision
appears to rest on a sort of visceral feeling that somehow, if relief were
252 F.2d 102 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 US. 968 (1958).
194 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. La.), af'd per curiam sub nor. Gremillion v. United States,
368 U.S. 11 (1961). See the discussion of all these cases in Note, .supranote 8, at 113-14.
22 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
23 For an exhaustive study of the background facts of Dombrowski see Brewer, Dorn20

21

browski v. Pfister: Federal Injunctions Against State Prosecutions in Civil Rights CasesA New Trend in Federal-Statejudicial Relations, 34 FoasAme L. REv. 71 (1965). This

article also contains an excellent analysis of the scope of that decision and its possible
implications for the future.
24 Rv. STAT. §§ 1979-80 (1875), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1964).
2.5 See Complaint No. 14019, Dombrowski v. Pfister, E.D. La., 1963. Also relevant to
the scope of this note is a later case which developed out of this same fact situation,
involving another possible type of relief. See Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967)

(per curiam).
26 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556, 560 (E.D. La. 1964).
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granted, the Court would be impinging on States' Rights."2 7 Judge Wisdom
finds federal injunctive relief under these circumstances entirely consistent
with federalism.
There is, therefore, no substance to the majority's argument that the
federal court is here being asked to interfere with orderly state criminal
processes ....

The processes under attack in this case are, allegedly, not

the State's usual, orderly, impersonal, legislative and criminal processes.

28

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the three-judge district
court. The Court adopted the same logic as was used in the dissenting
opinion below in dealing with the nature of federalism. "[T]he Court has
recognized that federal interference with a State's good-faith administration
20
of its criminal laws is peculiarly inconsistent with our federal framework."
Dombrowski sets out two situations in which injunctive relief is appropriate.
These are referred to as the two "wings" of Dombrowski. First, equitable
relief is appropriate where an actual prosecution is threatened under a
statute which is challenged on its face as an overly broad and vague regulation of first amendment privileges.3 0 Second, equitable relief is appropriate
where state criminal statutes, though on their face valid, are being applied
for the purpose of discouraging protected activities without any hope of
ultimate success. 31 The Supreme Court reasoned that in either circumstance
there was in fact a danger of irreparable injury to the persons prosecuted
and that even ultimate reversal by the Supreme Court could not fully
protect them due to the "chilling effect" such action might have upon the
exercise of first amendment rights.
This case was viewed with great optimism by those who advocated a
much more prominent position for the federal courts in regulating abuses
27 Id. at 570.
28 Id. at 571.
29 Dombrowski

v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). (Emphasis added.)
80 Id. at 490.
31 Ibid. For an analysis of the second wing of Dombrowski, see the Fifth Circuit opinion
in Cox v. Louisiana, 348 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1965). Therein Judge Wisdom said this about
the prosecution of certain civil rights workers:
The second prosecution is without any hope of success. The district attorney's
transparent purpose is to harass and punish the petitioner for his leadership In the
civil rights movement, and to deter him and others from exercising rights of free
speech and assembly in Louisiana-in this instance, by advocating integration of
public accommodations.
Id. at 752. Judge Wisdom continued with this much quoted passage:
When a State, under the pretext of preserving law and order uses local laws, valid
on their face, to harass and punish citizens for the exercise of their constitutional
rights or federally protected statutory rights, the general principle must yield to the
exception: the federal system is imperiled.
Ibid.
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in the state judicial process. One author referred to this case as possibly
containing

at least the beginnings of a dramatic new synthesis which, if followed,
will undoubtedly have a profound effect upon the relationship between
the federal and state judicial systems and, ultimately, upon the under-

standing and application of constitutional principles by lower state
courts throughout America. 32
And there seemed to be good reason for this optimism. Freedom of expression was being emphasized in a number of decisions.33 Ma pp,34 Gideon,3 5
Escobedo36 and other cases demonstrated the willingness of the Supreme
Court to force state courts to comply with the commands of the Constitution.37 The temper of the Court seemed to make the time right for a concerted effort to sweep away some of the remaining obstacles that prevented
full use of the federal courts for vindication of constitutional rights.
CASES AFTER DOMBROwsKI-THE SCOPE OF DOMROWSIu

Let us now turn to subsequent Supreme Court cases (which tend to
dampen that enthusiasm) before attempting to assess the current vitality of
Dombrowski. In Cameron v. Johnson,38 the Supreme Court was given an
opportunity to rule that Section 1983, title 42, of the United States Code

was an express exception to the anti-injunction statute, Section 2283 of title
28. In Cameron, the petitioners, active in Negro voter registration, were

attacking the Mississippi anti-picketing statute. They alleged that the
stafute was void on its face for vagueness and overbreadth and that it was

unconstitutional as applied to plaintiffs and others similarly situated because it was being used to harass and interfere with rights of national
citizenship, principally the right to vote and freedom of expression. 9 But
instead of a decision on the merits, the Supreme Court delivered a per
Brewer, supra note 23, at 84.
See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
34 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
35 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US. 335 (1963).
36 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
37 See argument in Brewer, supra note 23, at 104. Brewer further argues that:
In the past, the Court has often allowed decisions clearly foreshadowing even more
dramatic rulings to stand for a time as writing on the wall, apparently in the hope
that the warning thus provided would be heeded in the appropriate quarters and
that stronger and broader opinions implementing the earlier rationale would prove
unnecessary.
Id. at 105. It is the argument of this paper that subsequent Supreme Court decisions
reveal that this in fact was not their purpose.
38 381 US. 741 (1965).
39 See Cameron v. Johnson, 244 F. Supp. 846, 850 (S.D. Miss. 1964). For a discussion of
this case see Note, supra note 8, at 94.
32
33

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol1/iss4/7

8

N/A: Bad Faith Prosecutions of Civil Rights Matters in State Courts--F

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1;656

curiam decision in which it vacated the order of the lower court and remanded for consideration of whether Section 228.3 barred a federal injunction, and if not, for a determination whether relief was proper in light of
Dombrowski.40 Mr. Justice Black in his dissenting opinion referred to the
majority opinion as "a cryptic, uninformative per curiam order." 41 He
continued by saying that
The summary disposition the Court makes of this case fails properly to
enlighten state or federal courts or the people who deserve to know
what are the rights of the people, the rights of affected groups, the
rights of the Federal Government, and the rights of the States in this
field of activities which encompasses some of the most burning, press42
ing and important issues of our time.
Black was of the opinion that Dombrowski was inapplicable to the facts of
Cameron, and determined that there are two basic situations covered by
40
that case. First, there is a statute unconstitutional on its face involved;
but second,
Dombrowski also indicates to me that there might be cases in which
state or federal officers, acting under color of a law which is valid, could
be enjoined from engaging in unlawful conduct which deprives persons of their federally guaranteed statutory or constitutional rights,4'
But Black makes it clear that to use this argument the petitioner must be
quite specific in his allegations, and presumably would require a heavy
burden of proof.
I cannot believe for one moment that this Court in Dombrowski
intended to authorize federal injunctions completely suspending all enforcement of a constitutionally valid state criminal law merely because
state defendants allege that state officials are about to harass them by
doing no more than enforcing that valid law against them in the state
4 5

courts.

Black is clearly concerned with the right of a state through dear and specific statutes to control their streets and public properties. In this respect,
majority and dissenting opinions both emphasize the continued vitality of
40 Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741, 742 (1965). The lower court held on remand that

§ 2283 did bar a federal injunction. Cameron v. Johnson, 262 F. Supp. 878 (S.D. Miss.
1966). See the original decision in 244 F. Supp. 846 (S.D. Miss. 1964). This writer can find
no record of an appeal from the decision of the district court on remand.
41 Cameron v. Johnson, supra note 40, at 742 (dissenting opinion).
42 Ibid.
43 Id. at 748.
44 Id. at 749.

45 Id. at 752.
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Douglas v. City of Jeannette.Justice White's opinion also indicates the need
for clarification in this area.
It is obvious, however, that several of my Brethren find more
g 'dance in Dombrowski than I do and more than I think a district
judge can find in either that case or this unrevealing per curiam remand, which ignores the differences between this case and Dombrowski.4 0
Then, in City of Greenwood v. Peacock,47 the Supreme Court was asked
to allow removal of state prosecutions which were alleged to be in violation
of a defendant's civil rights under appropriate federal law. In Peacock,

such charges as obstructing public streets, assault and disturbing the peace
were involved. The civil rights workers alleged that the obstruction-ofstreets statute was unconstitutionally vague on its face, unconstitutional as

applied, and that its application was part of a general policy in Mississippi
of racial discrimination. Likewise, they alleged that the sole purpose of the
arrests and prosecutions was to harass and punish them for their exercise
of constitutionally protected activity. Their claim for removal was based
upon title 28 of the United States Code, sections 1443(1) and 1443(2). 48
The Supreme Court rejected both claims. Section 1443(2) was held to be
available only to federal officers and to persons assisting such officers in the
46 Id. at 759 (dissenting opinion).
47 384 US. 808 (1966). On the same day as it handed down the Peacock case, the court
also decided Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966). In Rachel, the civil rights workers
were arrested while attempting to receive service in certain restaurants. Upon their arrest
and subsequent prosecution under Georgia's criminal trespass statute, they petitioned for
removal under § 1443. The District Court refused to remove, and this was revrsed by

the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision,
agreeing that Harm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964), was applicable. Harem
made the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964). applicable to protected conduct which had occurred before the 1964 act was passed. Rachel makes it dear that
§ 1443(1) is available to persons whose prosecution stems exdusively from an activity
protected by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, i.e., the peaceful exercise of the right to equal
accommodation in establishments covered by the Civil Rights Act of 196-L For a very
thorough analysis of Rachel and Peacock, see Note, Federal Jurisdiction:The Civil Rights
Removal Statute Revisited, 1967 DuKE UJ. 136.
48 The dvil rights removal provisions are as follows:
Any of the following dvii actions or criminal prosecutions, commenced in a State
court may be removed by the defendant to the district court of the United States for
district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending:
(1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such State
a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United
States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof;
(2) For any act under color of authority derived from any law providing for equal
rights, or for refusing to do any act on the ground that it would be inconsistent with
such law.
28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1964).
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performance of their official duties. 49 The rejection of Section 1443(1),
however, is probably more significant in our discussion. The Supreme Court
chose to adopt a very narrow construction of this section, holding that the
phrase "equal civil rights" did not include the broad constitutional guarantees of the first amendment.50 This was consistent with a long line of decisions.51 The Court emphasized in its holding that it was not suggesting
that the petitioners had not alleged a denial of rights guaranteed under
federal law, but rather that the removal statute was not the proper means of
redress for these wrongs.
Many persons have disagreed with the Court's conclusion on this point;
strong arguments have been made that removal was the proper remedy
here.52 One writer 3 expressed disappointment in this decision by saying:
When it was decided in April 1965, Dombrowski v. Pfister seemed to
herald a radical expansion of federal protection for embattled local
minorities. But barely one year later the Supreme Court reneged....
With its renewed ban on direct intervention [in Peacock], the Court
4
has senselessly disarmed the Southern federal bench.
Further, the Court in Peacock discussed the Dombrowski remedy as one
of the alternative means of redressing the wrongs alleged.
If the state prosecution or trial on the charge of obstructing a public
street or on any other charge would itself clearly deny their rights pro.
tected by the First Amendment, they may under some circumstances
obtain an injunction in the federal court.55
There is, of course, great danger in attempting to read too much into
any portion of an opinion. But the above language is highly restrictive and
certainly seems to negate any inference that Dombrowski will be given a
broader scope . Moreover, later language in the opinion tends to indicate a
continued shift in the concern of the Court. And this language may well
prove crucial in the decision of later cases.
It is worth contemplating what the result would be if the strained
interpretation of § 1443(1) urged by the individual petitioners were to
49 City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 584 U.S. 808, 815 (1966).
50 Id. at 825.
51 See, e.g., Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1 (1906); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303 (1879).

52 See Johnson, Removal of Civil Rights Cases from State to Federal Courts: The
Matrix of Section 1443, 26 FEn. B.J. 99 (1966); Note, FederalJurisdiction:The Civil Rights
Removal Statute Revisited, 1967 Duxa L.J. 136; Note, The Dombrowski Remedy-Federal
Injunctions Against State Court Proceedings Violation of Constitutional Rights, 21
Ruro s L. REv. 92, 118-120 (1966).
53 Note, Theories of Federalism and Civil Rights, 75 YALE L.J. 1007, 1050 (1966).
54 Id. at 1050, 1052.
55 City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 829 (1966). (Emphasis added.)
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prevail.... [I]f the individual petitioners should prevail in their interpretation of § 1443(1), then every criminal case in every court of every
State--on any charge from a five-dollar misdemeanor to first-degree
murder-would be removable to a federal court upon a petition alleging
(1) that the defendant was being prosecuted because of his race and that
he was completely innocent of the charge brought against him, or (2)
that he would be unable to obtain a fair trial in the state court. On
motion to remand, the federal court would be required in every case
to hold a hearing, which would amount to at least a preliminary trial of
the motivations of the state officers who arrested and charged the defendant, of the quality of the state court or judge before whom the
charges were filed, and of the defendant's innocence or guilt.50
The decision in Adderly v. Floridar7 is also relevant in this discussion,
even though it did not involve an attempt to obtain relief in the lower
federal courts from abuses in the state courts. In Adderley, the defendants,
at Florida A. & M. University, were arrested during demonstrations at the
county jail. They were protesting the earlier arrest of other protesting students. The defendants were convicted on a charge of "trespass with a
malicious and mischievous intent."58 The Supreme Court upheld the convictions of these defendants.
One commentator lamented this decision and mentioned the following
grounds upon which the Court could have reversed the convictions:5 9
(1) The offense as defined by the instructions was unconstitutionally
vague,
(2) the convictions were based on an indefensible sort of entrapment,
(3) the statute was applied as a licensing statute with no legislative
standards for the exercise of discretion,
(4) the statute was specifically overbroad in punishing petitioners for
engaging in constitutionally protected behavior,

(5) the statute was generally overbroad because it applied to fact situations in which the court has found constitutionally protected behavior,
and
(6) there was insufficient evidence to support at least one element of
the offense. 60
Yet the Court did not choose to reverse by adopting any of these techniques.
Although too much can easily be read into this case, it represents at least
56 Id. at 832.
57 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
58 Id. at 40.
59 Kipperman, Civil Rights at Armageddon-The Supreme Court Steps Bah: Adderly
v. Florida,3 LAw iN TRANs. Q. 219 (1966).
60 Id. at 234, 235.
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a warning that a minimum of responsibility and care must be exercised in
overt conduct, even though such conduct is also mixed with expression and
association. Or, in the words of the Court, this represents a negation of the
view
that people who want to propogandize protests or views have a constitutional right to do so whenever and however and wherever they
please.... We reject [this concept of constitutional law]. The United
State Constitution does not forbid a State to control the use of its own
property for its own lawful nondiscriminatory purpose. 01
Certainly, however, this case can not be viewed as a repudiation of the

notion that the first amendment privileges enjoy a very high place in our
scale of values. Yet the case does represent an awareness on the part of the

Supreme Court of some of the practical limitations that must be placed upon
such mixed conduct. And it is an express declaration that certain types of
conduct are unlawful. This has definite implications for our injunction
problem, since this decision narrows the area of protected activities, or at
least creates some doubt as to the nature of protected conduct,

This problem in Adderley leads to a discussion of the present scope of the
Dombrowski remedies in light of the aforementioned decisions. Can there
be a bad-faith prosecution of unprotected activity? An affirmative answer
seems to be required; but this problem may be more theoretical than real,
since the proof of bad faith would be an extremely difficult burden when
the prosecution is of illegal conduct under a valid statute. For example,
Carmichaelv. A llen 2 involved, among other things, an intended prosecution
under Georgia's Riot Statute. One of the arguments of petitioners was that
irrespective of whether the statute was constitutional or not, it was being
applied against the petitioners, "not in a bona fide effort to vindicate the
state's criminal laws, but only to discourage the plaintiffs' civil rights activities."0 3 The court recognized the theoretical validity of this contention,
citing this portion of Dombrowski:
[A]ppellants have attacked the good faith of the appellees [state officials]
in enforcing the statutes, claiming that they have invoked, and threaten
to continue to invoke, criminal process without any hope of ultimate
success, but only to discourage appellants' civil rights activities. If these
allegations state a claim under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
as we believe they do... [citing cases] the interpretation ultimately put
on the statutes by the state courts is irrelevant. 04
61 Adderly v. Florida, 885 U.S. 39, 48 (1966).
62 267 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Ga. 1967).
03

Id. at 22.

64 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 490 (1965).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 1967

13

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 4 [1967], Art. 7

1967]

CIVIL RIGHTS

The court in Carmichael pointed out the extremely heavy burden that the
petitioner must carry to prevail on that issue and concluded that the petitioners before them had simply failed to carry this burden. However, the
court may have been overly generous in dealing with this point, as one of
the conditions explicitly posited by Dombrowski is that the state prosecution be "without any hope of ultimate success."65 The Cox case G0 illustrates
a bad-faith prosecution under a prima facie valid statute. But there the
doctrine of unconstitutional application of a statute was used where the
conduct prosecuted was of a type guaranteed by the federal constitution
and federal statutes. Beyond this, i.e., a statute valid on its face and validly
applied, it would seem that Dombrowski would not reach.
Is the Dombrowski remedy limited to a first amendment context? For
instance, could a Negro charged with murder, or any other charge which in
itself does not relate to first amendment privileges, petition a federal district
court for injunctive relief alleging that the prosecution is a bad-faith prosecution? Recall the dicta in Peacock which limited injunctive relief to cases
where the "charge would itself clearly deny their rights protected by the
First Amendment."0 7 But wouldn't this charge be a possible means of intimidating other persons in their exercise of free expression? On a showing
that the murder charge is entirely groundless, motivated by an intent to
intimidate others, isn't this case within the scope of the second wing of
Dombrowski? It seems that these facts would merit injunctive relief, for
here the motivation to intimidate others is present and therefore the test
of "irreparable injury" is met.
Yet the thesis of this paper is that the Supreme Court has retained the
"irreparable injury" test, met in Dombrowski by the element of a "chilling"
of first amendment exercise. True, the concerns of the Supreme Court have
shifted in recent years. But inherent in recent cases is a recognition of some
of the practical problems that are involved in this area. There is the realization of the problems that would be created if there were massive attempts
in the federal district courts to enjoin state criminal proceedings. A petition
for relief usually requires that a federal court hold a hearing and a preliminary investigation to see if there is any merit in the petitioners allegations.
This unquestionably is a timely process. But under Dombrowski the extreme
cases are enjoinable; there is relief for the defendant caught in that difficult
situation. But most cases are not so clear. There is conflicting evidence and
there is at least some reasonable question. Therefore, we find the federal
courts involved in extensive hearings and findings, only to deny relief for
lack of sufficient proof. The Supreme Court has demonstrated a desire to
keep that kind of case out of the federal system under our present laws.
65 Ibid.
66 Cox v. Louisiana,
67

379 US. 536 (1965).
City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 829 (1966).
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EXPANSION OF DOMBROWSKI?

The legal arguments for expanded federal initiative are persuasive. The
argument is simple: The state certainly has the legitimate interest in the
good faith prosecution of its criminal laws, but the misuse of this function
through bad faith prosecutions to harass civil rights workers is not a legitimate function, nor a legitimate need of the state. Judge Wisdom puts it
aptly.
The general principle, basic to American Federalism, that United
States courts usually should refrain from interfering with state courts'
enforcing local laws is unassailable. But the sharp edge of the Supremacy
Clause cuts across all such generalizations. When a State, under the
pretext of preserving law and order uses local laws, valid on their face,
to harass and punish citizens for the exercise of their constitutional
rights or federally protected statutory rights, the general principle must
yield to the exception: the federal system is imperiled.08
No "needless" friction is created between the state and federal courts when
the state so acts in violation of guaranteed rights. But to some extent this
particular argument views incorrectly the real nature of the problems involved. Prima facie bad-faith prosecutions are enjoinable under present law.
Yet in the majority of cases it is not such an easy matter to label a prosecution as being carried on in bad faith. The argument is made that within this
"grey area" the possibilities for subtile harassment are unlimited, that therefore we should let a more independent body, a more responsible body decide
this question of bad faith. It is difficult to read Kunstler's work or the findings of the United States Commission on Equal Protection without being
deeply troubled by the plight of those who continue to be denied full freedom. We in this country pride ourselves upon our "racial progress," yet these
recent works show dearly that this progress falls far short of reaching the
goals we have set. If the arguments for massive change are accepted, and they
have much support, then we should realize where they will carry us. One
must at least be conscious of the practical consequences that such changes
will bring.
Many suggestions for reform have been made in recent years. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Special Committee on Civil Rights
Under Law, has made a proposal for a Federal Civil Rights Procedure Law00
which contains many of the typical suggestions for reform. These recommendations seem well written and worthy of consideration. Their report
focuses upon changes in the law of removal and injunctive relief. First, the
68 Cox v. Louisiana, 348 F.2d 750, 752 (5th Cir. 1965).
69 See Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Cons.

mittee of the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 975-1057 (1966) [hereinaftcr called
Hearings].
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Committee recommended two additions to Section 1443, providing that in
addition to (1) and (2) of that section, defendants may remove to the federal
courts any state criminal prosecution:
(3) For any exercise, or attempted exercise, of any right granted,
secured or protected by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or of any other
right granted, secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the
United States against the denial of equal protection of the laws on
account of race, color, religion or national origin; or
(4) For any exercise, or attempted exercise, of any right to freedom
of speech or of the press or of the people to peaceably assemble secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States when committed in
furtherance of any right of the nature described in subsection (3) of this
section.70
Several specific comments by the committee on this proposal are of special
significance here. The committee seriously considered a scheme in which
removal would no longer be automatic on the filing of appropriate papers
but would take place only upon an order by the district court after an evidentiary showing. The committee rejected this scheme, believing that the
burden of sending the case back to the state courts should be upon the
prosecutor after an appropriate motion for remand. The committee's justification for the continued use of the automatic removal device and the expanded availability of removal are quite interesting. The committee points
out that (1) under the present wording of the statute in subsections (1) and
(2) there have been many removal petitions filed in recent years; (2) under
the new rules, less resort to habeas corpus and equitable relief would be
required; and (3) "in any event, deprived persons should not be denied the
enjoyment of Federally granted rights to equal protection of the laws because of inconvenience to judges or to other litigants."7 1 The chairman of
this bar committee argued before the U.S. Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights 2 that his bill confines itself to situations "where commencement of
the prosecution is a denial of equal protection or is a violation of one of the
civil rights which the Federal Government itself has granted."73 It is not the
purpose of this paper to urge defeat of such a proposal nor defeat of the

proposals on expansion of federal injunctive relief.74 But in all honesty these
70 Hearings, supra note 69, at 1017. See also the commentary on this proposal Id.
994-999.
71 Hearings, supra note 69, at 998-99.
72 Hearings,supra note 69, at 1024.
73 Ibid.
74 The recommended addition to § 1983 is as follows:

at

(b) Such redress shall include the grant of an injunction to stay a proceeding in a
State court where such proceeding was instituted for.
(1) Any exercise, or attempted exercise, of any right granted, secured or protected
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proposals of the New York Committee are broad in scope and involve immense practical problems.

The recent proposals75 of the American Law Institute help illustrate this
point. They have recommended that no changes be made in the civil rights
removal statute.76 They justify this stand by reference to "strong practical
objections to such a course." 77 Then, they pose the question raised by the
Court in Peacock: "Has the historic practice of holding state criminal trials
in state courts-with power of ultimate review of any federal questions in
this Court-been such a failure that the relationship of the state and federal
courts should now be revolutionized?" 78 The ALI determined that its own
answer must be negative. 79 However, the ALI has chosen to make a much
needed change as to injunctive relief, In its Section 1372(7), presently Section
by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or of any other right granted, secured or protected
by the Constitution or laws of the United States against the denial of equal protection of the laws on account of race, color, religion or national origin; or
(2) Any exercise, or attempted exercise, of any right to freedom of speech or of the
press or of the people to peaceably assemble secured by the Constitution or laws of
the United States, when committed in furtherance of arly right of the nature dcScribed in subparagraph (I) of this subsection [i.e., the present § 1983];
and where:
(i) An issue determinative of the proceeding in favor of the party seeking the Injunction has been decided in favor of his contention in a final decision In another
proceeding arising out of a like factual situation;
(ii) The statute, ordinance, administrative regulation or other authority for the
proceeding has been declared unconstitutional in a final decision in another pro.
ceeding;
(iii) The statute, ordinance, administrative regulation or other authority for the
proceeding is, on its face, an unconstitutional abridgment of the rights to freedom
of speech or of the press or of the people to peaceably assemble; or
(iv) The proceeding was instituted for the purpose of discouraging the parties or
others from exercising rights of freedom of speech or of the press or of the people
to peaceably assemble.
Hearings, supra note 69, at 1019. For commentary on this proposal, see id. at 999-1005.
75

ALI,

STUDY or THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION

BErWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS

(rent. Draft No. 5, 1967).
76 Id. at 9-10.
77 Id. at 110-11.
78 City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 834 (1966).
79 ALI, supra note 75, at 111. A further comment is interesting.
The Reporters, their Advisers' and the Council are agreed that if fundamental
changes are to be made in that relationship in the area of civil rights, such changes
would more appropriately come in a civil rights bill than in a jurisdictional study.
Accordingly we propose in this subsection to preserve the present removal statute
unchanged.
Id. at 111, 112. This comment does not seem to reflect a consensus that such fundamental
changes are desirable even in a civil rights bill. At least, the comment emphasizes the
grave concern with which these persons view any such changes.
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2283, the AIl has recently added this language representing another exception to the anti-injunction statute, alloing relief if
(7) the injunction is to restrain a criminal prosecution that should not
be permitted to continue either because the statute or other law that is
the basis of the prosecution plainly cannot constitutionally be applied
to the party seeking the injunction or because the prosecution is so
plainly discriminatory against one who has engaged in conduct privileged under the Constitution or laws of the United States as to amount
to a denial of the equal protection of the laws.8 0
Professor Wright has argued against massive changes in our law of removal
and injunction as a solution to civil rights problems in the South.8 ' The
Supreme Court has, at least for a time, placed the burden upon the legislative branch to make massive changes if indeed such changes are deemed
necessary. Before we allow this flood of cases to enter the federal courts, it
would seem essential that we re-think the composition and work of the
federal courts. Even at present the overcrowding of the federal courts is a
matter of grave concern, especially in the Fifth Circuit.82 It will require
revamping the federal trial courts before we can shove all that litigation into
their hands. It is not fair to the other litigants or to the judges unless needed
change occurs, whether it be more judges, elimination of diversity cases,
or otherwise.
These proposed changes would fundamentally affect our federal courts
and are not to be made lightly. Moreover, under our present notions, the
basic responsibility for criminal jurisdiction rests with the state courts. A
fundamental change in this arrangement should be made with a full aware-

ness of all the practical implications involved, and not in a flurry of idealistic
slogans. It is submitted that the present law, though permeated by uncertainty, is at least temporarily the most desirable course for the future.
J. L. C., Jr.
80 Id. at 32. For commentary on this proposal, see id. at 184-188.
81 Classroom discussion with Professor Wright, April, 1967.
82 Wright, The Overloaded FifLth Circuit: A Crisis In judicial Administration, 42
TEXAs L. Ray. 949 (1964).
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